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 1 
TITLE: A response to the Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative’s Report “Establishing Best Practice 1 
for Forensic DNA Databases” 2 
 3 
Dear Editors, 4 
 5 
Over the last few decades, a series of concerns have been raised about DNA profiling and 6 
databasing in the criminal justice system, in particular with relation to privacy and discrimination. 7 
There have also been calls to ensure responsible governance, ongoing consideration of safeguarding 8 
human rights, and appropriate multi-disciplinary and public debate relevant to ethical, social and 9 
political issues. The Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative’s 2017 Report: “Establishing best practice 10 
for forensic DNA databases” [1] provides an important response to these concerns. 11 
 12 
As a group of experts from a number of disciplines and backgrounds (including genetics, political 13 
science, sociology, law and ethics) and incorporating members of a range of organisations including 14 
the Public and Professional Policy Committee of the European Society of Human Genetics and the 15 
PHG Foundation, we commend the ambition of this 2017 Report. We also particularly applaud the 16 
Report’s breadth and depth of focus on the entire chain of responsibility from crime scene 17 
examination to the court system, including wider infrastructural elements. The Report is absolutely 18 
right to highlight that forensic databases should focus on DNA of convicted persons; that forensic 19 
use of DNA without the subject’s full, informed consent can only be justified in limited 20 
circumstances, such as to solve a very serious crime; and that non-forensic DNA databases should, 21 
in general, not be accessible for forensic purposes. We also underscore the issues raised in the 22 
Report about the risk of over-reliance on DNA evidence - perhaps, as we would suggest, because 23 
we live in a society where technological evidence is often trusted more than human judgement; and 24 
agree with the Report’s emphasis on the continued need to balance expected benefits with the risk 25 
of misuse of information held in forensic databases. 26 
  27 
 2 
At the same time we believe some issues within the Report deserve more specific and more 28 
systematic attention. We provide a brief overview of these here, seeking to contribute to setting the 29 
agenda for what we hope will be broad discussions on the governance of forensic genetics in the 30 
criminal justice system involving multiple disciplines and stakeholders. 31 
 32 
Blurring boundaries: DNA-based information inside and outside of forensic databases 33 
Many countries currently have functioning national forensic DNA databases which store the DNA 34 
profiles of suspected and/or convicted criminals in the form of short tandem repeats (STRs).i Some 35 
jurisdictions’ databases also include DNA profiles from other individuals such as victims or 36 
volunteers. When there are no known suspects of a crime, traditional forensic DNA testing uses 37 
these databases to compare an STR profile obtained from a crime scene with all STR profiles in the 38 
database to see whether there is a match. If there is, this could mean that the person whose profile 39 
matches a crime scene profile is involved in some way with the crime (for example, by committing 40 
or aiding in the crime, or being present during the crime), but this would need to be established with 41 
further evidence; a profile match alone is not sufficient proof. STR profiles used in forensics are 42 
derived from markers located in non-coding DNA regions and as such, it is perceived that no 43 
information regarding disease- or personality-related characteristics can be inferred.ii With the 44 
advent of high-throughput next-generation sequencing (NGS) or massive parallel sequencing 45 
(MPS), the efficient generation of data at the nucleotide level beyond that of STR profiles alone has 46 
allowed laboratories to produce much more wide-ranging DNA information - for example, single 47 
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data from within STR markers, which can lead to greater 48 
discrimination between alleles. This has had implications for the development of new forensic 49 
genetic approaches, one example of which is forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) [2]. 50 
                                                        
i Short sequences of DNA situated in defined places (loci) across the genome, which are tandemly 
repeated numerous times. The set number of times an STR is repeated can differ between 
individuals, and between each individual’s STRs, and it is these numbers which are stored in 
forensic DNA databases. 
ii Though we note that the separation between coding and non-coding DNA, which so far has served 
as an “ethical boundary” to determine what DNA information could be used for forensic purposes 
and what could not, is becoming increasingly blurred. 
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 51 
FDP allows for the probabilistic inference of likely phenotypic characteristics from DNA, such as 52 
age, appearance and ancestry. Rather than being stored in national forensic DNA databases, in 53 
countries where FDP is used for specific criminal investigations, SNP-based information is stored 54 
de-centrally in laboratories performing the analysis. This leads to a scenario in which DNA-based 55 
information in criminal investigations is used in wider contexts than centralised STR-databases 56 
alone. Identifying what responsible governance should look like for forensic databases that do not 57 
use national centralised databasesiii therefore now requires consideration of how such findings 58 
should be stored; who should have access to them; and how findings (which are highly probabilistic 59 
and predictive, and raise issues of discrimination) should be communicated with, and inform, 60 
operative police work. 61 
  62 
The implications of NGS or MPS raise other new regulatory, ethical, and social questions.iv For 63 
example, current pushes for more public donation of genomic (and linked clinical) data to biobanks 64 
mean that non-forensic DNA databases are becoming larger, both in terms of the types of data 65 
included, and the number of people whose data are stored in them. Especially in high profile 66 
criminal cases it will be difficult to resist the political push to make data in these databases, which is 67 
curated for medical research, open to use in criminal investigations. Whilst not directly applicable 68 
to biobanks, a recent case in the United States exemplifies this issue. Here, law enforcement 69 
identified a familial match [3] of a suspected perpetrator by searching a free online genetic 70 
genealogy database, GEDMatch, where people interested in finding genetic relatives upload their 71 
DNA profiles that they have previously obtained from private DNA companies.v Despite the relief 72 
that this case could be solved, commentators were concerned about police accessing a database that 73 
                                                        
iii On a minor note, the document states that in the jurisdictions in which FDP is currently being 
used, the technology is being sold as a commercial service to the police. This is inaccurate - in most 
jurisdictions in which FDP is being used, the police use their own, or academic, forensic centres 
who have the expertise to perform such tests. 
iv https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ethical-dimensions-of-next-generation-sequencing 
v http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43916830 
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people had contributed to who did not have law enforcement use in mind. This raises deep 74 
questions about function creep [4], about meaningful informed consent,vi and about the requirement 75 
for public deliberation about what - and how - boundaries between functional purposes of databases 76 
containing personal information and/or public databases containing DNA should be maintained. 77 
This deliberation has become increasingly urgent following the declaration of cooperation signed 78 
by 13 EU member states  to reach a shared collection of one million sequenced genomes accessible 79 
in the EU by 2022.vii  80 
 81 
The context of big data and data mining 82 
The Report regards forensic databases in isolation and not as part of a wider context of big data, 83 
automated processing and data mining. By doing so, the Report misses the present key challenge for 84 
the use of DNA information for crime prevention: the integration of DNA-based information, 85 
biometric data, and also data from sensors in public and personal domains (not only CCTV but also 86 
“smart speakers” etc). Data from Google Home and Amazon Echo have already started to be used 87 
in ongoing investigations.viii Different datasets, taken together, can be used to detect patterns of 88 
particularly “risky” individuals, and this information can then be used preemptively.ix For example, 89 
                                                        
vi The “Best Practice” Report states that “Best practice for police access to stored genetic 
information...requires strict oversight: including not only authorisation by a court, but also 
carefully defined guidance on the circumstances in which such requests can be granted, and how 
much data can be revealed. Further, information needs to be provided to people who take part in 
such databases so they are aware”. Such information is currently provided to customers of 
commercial biobanks and DNA testing services. However, when the terms of service of biobanking 
and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing websites were studied, policies mentioned that 
genetic information may be shared with “authorities” via court order (Niemiec, E., & Howard, H. C. 
(2016). Ethical issues in consumer genome sequencing: Use of consumers' samples and data. 
Applied & Translational Genomics, 8, 23–30.). 23andme’s website states that “We will not use your 
sensitive information without your consent unless: (i) the information has been anonymized or 
aggregated so that you cannot reasonably be identified as an individual; or (ii) a legal obligation 
requires us to use it in some way e.g. a court order requires us to disclose the information, but it is 
questionable how many people read this information, which is often in the small print of the terms 
of service (https://www.23andme.com/en-gb/about/privacy/).  
vii http://euapm.eu/pdf/EAPM_Declaration_Genome.pdf 
viii http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/sites/default/files/2017-
12/Digital%20Assistants%20and%20Privacy.pdf 
ix https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2014/04/wpf-report-the-scoring-of-america-how-secret-
consumer-scores-threaten-your-privacy-and-your-future/ 
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using combinations of datasources in this way could impact on eligibility for other secondary uses, 90 
such as insurance. Whilst such scenarios may be some way off, they are already beginning to be 91 
considered in policy circles.x We stress that these considerations include discussions relating to data 92 
protection, data contextualisation, education, and the safeguarding of civil liberties. 93 
  94 
Exchanging forensic DNA information across borders 95 
We applaud the Report for referring to the Prüm regime, which allows the exchange of forensic 96 
DNA information across the national databases of 24 EU Member States, and which will remain of 97 
great relevance for Europe in the foreseeable future. The Report, however, misses a key aspect of 98 
the Prüm regime, namely that it has led to less personal data crossing borders, rather than more. 99 
This might be counterintuitive at first sight. But prior to Prüm, countries sent entire files including 100 
personal data from one country to another when they collaborated on an investigation. Now with 101 
Prüm, no personal information is made available unless the information held in both countries’ 102 
databases indicates a ‘match’. Only then will personal information cross borders. This underscores 103 
the importance of well-designed (in terms of privacy by default and privacy by design) systems for 104 
digital data exchange which can reduce privacy risks if implemented well (and if there are no other 105 
practices that increase risks to privacy). 106 
  107 
Data protection 108 
We are concerned with the Report’s confusion regarding relevant data protection frameworks for 109 
DNA profiling and databasing: neither the Data Protection Directive,xi nor its successor, the 110 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), are applicable to data processing by competent 111 
authorities for law enforcement purposes. Rather, a lex specialis is - which will be replaced by the 112 
                                                        
x The renaming of the UK DNA Database Ethics Group into “Biometrics and Forensics Ethics 
Group” reflects this: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-dna-database-ethics-
group 
xi Directive95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
(PII (US)) and on the free movement of such data 
 6 
EU Police Directive from May 2018.xii This means that some of the notice and consent 113 
requirements that the GDPR prescribes (and that the Report considers essential) will not be granted, 114 
as the Police Directive provides exceptions in cases where notification would impede public interest 115 
in an ongoing investigation. 116 
 117 
The commercialisation of forensic science 118 
Whilst the Report mentions the overarching commercial interests in forensic DNA technology 119 
development and use, we believe that this requires more scrutiny. In particular, we argue that 120 
technology development for law enforcement purposes needs to be something that is a public 121 
function and should not rely exclusively on commercial providers. Accountable public bodies need 122 
to play an important role, not only in setting standards for technology validation and deployment 123 
but they also need to provide services themselves where there is strong public interest that service 124 
provision is committed solely to public interest and not commercial profits.   125 
 126 
Points to consider 127 
Moving forward, in line with/building on the initiative of the report on Establishing Best Practice 128 
for Forensic DNA Databases, and given the issues discussed in this response, we urge that any 129 
discussion of human rights safeguards in the context of forensic genetics is opened up to the debate 130 
about the governance of forensic genetics and its associated social, ethical and regulatory concerns 131 
in this wider sense. In particular we suggest the following points to consider: 132 
 133 
-    Next Generation Sequencing. It will be increasingly hard to insist that only ‘non-coding’ 134 
DNA can be used for criminal investigation. We thus welcome ongoing initiatives to 135 
                                                        
xii Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
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systematically consider the ethical and social dimensions of these practices and contribute to 136 
better policies to regulate the use of DNA information. 137 
-    Growing possibilities of integrating data from several sources: Instead of treating forensic 138 
DNA information as a system on its own, consider the collection and use of data in forensic 139 
DNA databases as part of a larger data ecosystem with greater possibilities to integrate 140 
different types of data. 141 
-    Use of distributed data: Be attentive to the ethical challenges related to contexts where DNA 142 
and other data are used to prevent, solve, and punish crimes do not come from centralised 143 
databases but exist decentrally in local laboratories, people’s personal devices, and 144 
commercial companies. 145 
-    New accountability deficits: If wider sources of data and information are used than are 146 
stored in centralised DNA databases, this means that control over what data is included, 147 
over quality control etc. may not lie in the hands of public authorities but private 148 
corporations or even single individuals. This can create accountability and transparency 149 
deficits that need to be attended to. 150 
-   Commercial interests in DNA information for preventing and investigating: The changing 151 
landscape of actors in the development, provision, and monitoring of tools and services 152 
related to forensic DNA merits a fresh assessment of the effects of commercial interests in 153 
this field, and how they can be made transparent and accountable to the public. 154 
-   Stimulate regulation, awareness and debate on potential uses of DNA-based information 155 
obtained for non-forensic purposes, such as in the context of health care, research or 156 
ancestry testing that may increasingly become available in the public domain. 157 
-    Ongoing professional guidance: As the applications of forensic genetic technologies expand 158 
and diversify, education about when to use the technologies, and their potential benefits, 159 
limitations and uncertainties is essential for all those working in the criminal justice system. 160 
 161 
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